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”There are areas of  me / that are not human / pine woods, magma / that which I have 
been /fluorescent grammar / in a subterranean summer.”  
- Theis Ørntoft, Poems 2014 
  
1. Introduction 
Many ways there are to articulate the objective conditions of  human 
subjectivity. If  poetry is regarded as one way, philosophy ought to be regarded 
as another. Whereas young Danish poet Theis Ørntoft (1984-) in his Poems 
2014 invokes a host of  metaphors in order to stage and address the 
fluctuating and at most semi-stable foundations of  human being, American 
philosopher Graham Harman (1968-) in his The Quadruple Object expounds the 
structural components of  a metaphysics that uncovers the ontological 
relativity of  the objectively secured stability of  human subjectivity. The 
implications of  Harman's so-called 'object-oriented ontology' for the ethically 
significant construal of  the relation between nature and freedom will be 
spelled out towards the end of  my article. 
 In order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings of  the intellectual 
intentions behind the present paper, it is important that the three main ways 
of  interpreting the expression 'the nature of  freedom' is clarified from the 
start. First, the expression designates what might also be referred to as the 
'essence' of  freedom, and in that case the expression announces that the 
article will primarily deal with the truth pertaining to freedom. Second, the 
expression names the crucial relation that have always held and always will 
hold sway between nature and freedom, insofar as there belongs a specific way 
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in which 'nature' must be and be understood if  such a thing as 'freedom' is to 
be the case. Third, the expression might be understood as announcing that 
nature is itself  an expression of  freedom. Now, whether nature's freedom is 
understood in terms of  self-activity ('Selbst-tätigkeit') or in other ways, the 
idea is that a certain mode of  freedom belongs to the ways of  nature. In the 
present article, it is primarily the second interpretation that I will pursue, but 
by doing so I will inevitably touch upon the two others. The guiding questions 
of  my article are therefore the following: 'what kind of  nature must be the 
case if  freedom is real?', 'what must we understand by 'nature' if  we insist that 
human beings are capable of  freedom?' and/or 'how can we conceptually 
unify the immanence of  nature and the transcendence of  freedom?' 
 The challenging task of  unifying nature and freedom guided much of  
the philosophical work carried out within the parameters of  what we now 
refer to as the 50 'golden years' of  European thought from 1781 (publication 
of  the first edition of  Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) Kritik der reinen Vernunft) 
to 1831 (Hegel's death by cholera), i.e. 'German idealism'. Friedrich Heinrich 
Jacobi (1743-1819) significantly influenced the development of  post-Kantian 
philosophy insofar as he revitalised the otherwise totally absent interest in the 
philosophy of  Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677). In his Über die Lehre des Spinoza 
(1785, 1789 and 1819) Jacobi presented what I consider to be an ultimate 
philosophical dilemma: the choice between 1) the faith of  religion in a 
personal God, and 2) the rational-materialistic determinism of  philosophy. 
Jacobi coined the expression 'nihilism' to make reference to the dilemma's 
latter option. By introducing this significant dilemma unto the stage of  
thinking, Jacobi stroke some of  the central chords in what was to become the 
ambitious philosophy of  G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). Jacobi's philosophical 
'either-or' – i.e. the choice between Christian dogmatism and Spinozistic 
rationalism – thus set the stage for European thinking after Kant. The great 
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challenge to be overcome nonetheless remained Kant's 'transcendental object' 
– i.e. 'das Ding an sich' – that logically had to be stipulated, if  Kant's critical 
program for philosophy were to make sense. The question concerning what 
might be called 'the autonomy of  reality', i.e. the existence of  objects 
independent of  human experience, played a key role in Hegel's development 
of  his so-called 'presuppositionless philosophy'. 
 Jacobi's dilemma was not only an inspiring challenge to philosophy in 
the first half  of  the 19th century. Still today the dilemma indirectly animates 
the ways in which contemporary philosophers try to work out the human 
condition as well as the state of  objective reality. The recent works of  the 
'object-oriented' philosopher Graham Harman will be introduced in order to 
show how it is today still possible and even beneficial to philosophise with 
'objects' as one's theoretical point of  departure. Harman presents us with 
ontological gestures that point towards ways to deal with the categories of  
'substance' and 'objects in themselves' that radically break with Hegel's 
'absolute idealism' that does not allow for objective knowledge unblemished 
by the stains of  the subjective moment involved in all knowing. What we 
encounter in 'object oriented ontology' is something quite new, quite exciting 
and quite radical that really puts us on, ontologically speaking, new grounds. I 
will argue that Harman even casts the relation between ethics and philosophy 
in a new light and in doing so implicitly proves himself  to be an heir to 
Spinoza's rationalist metaphysics. 
 My article is structured in a way that allows for Spinoza, Hegel and 
Harman to respond to Jacobi's dilemma in ways consistent with their 
respective philosophical positions. My task has therefore been to do justice to 
the philosophies of  Spinoza, Hegel and Harman in my articulation of  the 
logical outcomes of  their respective attitudes to the dilemma posed by Jacobi. 
(Obviously, Spinoza did not have a chance of  responding to Jacobi's dilemma 
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himself  due to the simple fact that the dilemma was first presented some 
200+ years after the death of  Spinoza. Therefore, my presentation of  
Spinoza's 'response' is an anachronistic conceptual construction based on the 
logical integrity of  Spinoza's metaphysics as presented in his post-humous 
magnum opus Ethics from 1677.) But let me now begin by introducing and 
accounting for what I propose to call 'Jacobi's dilemma'. 
 
2. Jacobi's Dilemma 
On a fundamental level 'German idealism' is characterised by the 
philosophical attempt to systematically conceptualize the possibility of  
'freedom' and 'autonomy' in order to clear the path for their actual realization. 
Some of  the crucial events that paved the way for this ambition to come 
about was, among other things, the emergence of  scientific thinking in the late 
middle ages, the 'reformation' inaugurated by Martin Luther in the 1510s and 
'the French revolution' that swept through the streets of  Paris in the 1780s. As 
Stephen Houlgate puts it in relation to Hegel's philosophy: 
Hegel's philosophy presupposes as its historical precondition not only the 
extraordinary developments in German intellectual life since 1770 but also the 
general modern interest in freedom, self-determination, and critical self-scrutiny, 
which Hegel traces back to the Reformation and to Cartesian thought (indeed to the 
emergence of  scientific enquiry and civic freedom in cities in the late Middle Ages), 
and which he believes suffuses modern political, economic, aesthetic, religious, and 
philosophical life. […] Presuppositionless philosophy is therefore a historical 
necessity – not in the sense that it could not fail to arise but in the sense that it alone 
is the philosophical fulfillment of  the modern historical demand for freedom. 
(Houlgate 2006, p. 69) 
 
Hegel himself  characterized the spirit that animated the thinking of  the 
philosophers of  German idealism in the following way: 
    
Der germanische Geist ist der Geist der neuen Welt, deren Zweck die Realisierung 
der absoluten Wahrheit als der unendlichen Selbstbestimmung der Freiheit ist, der 




The will to freedom permeates the German spirit of  post-Kantian philosophy 
which culminates in Hegel's encyclopedic philosophy. (Cf. Houlgate 2006, s. 
68) As a kind of  spiritual primus motor for the philosophical projects that were 
to define the content of  German idealism – and perhaps in particular Hegel's 
philosophy – Jacobi presented the dilemma that, according to him, had 
become inevitable to confront due to Spinoza's rationalistic metaphysics as 
presented in Ethics in 1677. All in all, Jacobi's dilemma can be said to be 
defined by the question concerning, on the one hand, human freedom and, on 
the other, human bondage – a contested dispute that has occupied 
philosophers ever since the ancient inauguration of  philosophical thinking, 
and which had been radically entertained by Martin Luther and Erasmus of  
Rotterdam in the 1520s. 
 I will now unfold Jacobi's dilemma and begin by presenting his 
demonstration of  how things, metaphysically speaking, must be, if  man is 
considered as essentially unfree. 
 
“Der Mensch hat keine Freiheit” 
In his demonstration of  man's radical lack of  freedom, Jacobi follows the 
logic of  one of  the two aspects that Spinoza thought of  as characteristic of  
God or Nature. Therefore, in order to account for Jacobi's demonstration of  
human being's radical lack of  freedom, we must begin by accounting for some 
of  the central tenets of  Spinoza's metaphysics. In a stylistically typical passage 
from the first part of  Ethics, Spinoza introduces the notion of  'singular things' 
in relation to the relation between cause and effect: 
 
A thing which has been determined to produce an effect has necessarily been determined in this way 
by God; and one which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself  to produce an effect. 
[...] Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither 
exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by 
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another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause also can 
neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an 
effect by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so on, to infinity. 
(Spinoza 1996, p. 19 (IP26-8)) 
The causal reciprocity of  every singular thing is the defining characteristic of  
Spinoza's conception of  'finitude'. To grasp things in terms of  
'determination', i.e. 'being determined', entails grasping things in their purely 
mechanical aspect, and in so doing, focusing on things in terms of  their 
having been created, and thus, ultimately, on that which Spinoza calls 'Natura 
naturata'. This category is defined by Spinoza in the following way: 
[B]y Natura naturata I understand whatever follows from the necessity of  God's 
nature, or from any of  God's attributes, that is, all the modes of  God's attributes 
insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and can neither be nor be 
conceived without God. (Spinoza 1996, p. 21 (IP29Schol.)) 
   
Freedom is – for Jacobi as well as for Spinoza – impossible when things are 
only viewed from the perspective of  'Natura naturata'. From this perspective 
singular things appear as self-identical, hence steady and immobile, and they 
do so due to the fact that their causality has been retrospectively rationalized 
by human cognition. Thus, a link is forged between the perspective of  'Natura 
naturata' – i.e. grasping the causality of  created things – and rational human 
cognition. Therefore, Jacobi invokes the notion of  'personality' to characterise 
the moment of  self-identity that characterises all cognitive rationalisation of  
created things. (Cf. Jacobi 2000, p. 167-8 (§IX-X) – see also ibid., s. 238 
(Beilage IV).) 
 Now, Jacobi goes on to distinguish between 'rational' and 'irrational' 
desire. (Cf. Ibid., p. 168 (§XIV)) Whereas 'rational' desire is equivalent to what 
he calls 'natural drive' (i.e. the inflation of  personality (cf. ibid., p. 166-167 
(§IV) – or that which Spinoza calls 'conatus' or 'appetite' (cf. Spinoza 1996, p. 
75-76 (IIIP6-9)), 'irrational' desire is equivalent to actions that is not carried 
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out in accordance with the practical principles that every rational being is 
capable of  formulating as the axioms or maxims of  its personality. (Cf. Jacobi 
2006, p. 168 (§XIII)) The rational being becomes irrational as soon as its will 
and desire do not correspond and, further, that desire – and not will – is the 
driving force behind the actions of  the being in question. When the actions 
of  a rational being qualify it as irrational, it's essence is defined in terms of  
what might be called 'radical heteronomy' in the sense that the being in 
question is utterly determined by external causes. (The simple reason why 
'action through desire' is properly classified as an instance of  external 
causation is, that it is really the object of  desire that is in control of  what is 
done, and not the desiring being itself.) Therefore, Jacobi rightfully describes 
the mode of  actions of  an irrational being as ”lauter Mechanismus und keine 
Freiheit” (Ibid., p. 171 (§XXIII)). 
 Freedom and reason are linked, and insofar as the rational being cannot 
ensure that it is only moved by volition and not also by desire, it flounders, 
fails and, to its own surprise, finds itself  defined by irrationality. (Cf. ibid., p. 
168 (§XV)) The rational being cannot by itself  qualify itself  as 'radically 
autonomous', that is, it cannot act freely on its own, because every practical 
axiom or maxim – understood as expressions of  the rational identity of  its 
personality – are themselves based on the contingent factors of  desire and 
experience. (Cf. ibid., p. 170 (§XXI)) That which appears to be autonomously 
phrased axioms or maxims for rational actions, turns out to be nothing but a 
subtle and masked expression of  that against which it ought to have been a 
remedy: desire itself! This is what Jacobi takes to be the principle of  practical 
axioms or maxims, their a priori, from which it follows that human beings qua 
rational must be understood to be striving for ”seine Person zu erhalten, und 
was ihre Identität verletzen will, sich zu unterwerfen.” (Ibid., p. 170 (§XXII)) 
That which have been consciously fashioned by rational human beings is, in 
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truth, nothing but the cunning of  desire in relation to its own satisfaction. Or, 
to put it dramatically: behind the backs of  human beings, desire works its 
ways! The conception of  human beings that holds that human beings are 
unfree despite their awareness of  their own desires and appetites, is presented 
by Spinoza in the third part of  Ethics where he initiates the dialectical 
movement from 'determination' to 'auto-determination'. Spinoza gives voice 
to what derivatively serves as the point of  departure for intellectually secured 
freedom, in the following way: 
”[I]t is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want nor desire anything 
because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good 
because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it.” (Spinoza 1996, p. 76 
(IIIP9Schol.) – see also ibid., p. (IVP30-31).) 
 
The understanding of  freedom (auto-determination) as enabled to come 
about through the process of  intellectual insight into necessity 
(determination) plays, as we shall later see, a crucial role in Spinoza's own 
metaphysics of  freedom. This conception, however, is not shared by Jacobi 
insofar as he understands the intellectual insight into necessity as essentially 
unable to bring about freedom. According to Jacobi, rational insight into 
necessity only amounts to an ever expanding mapping of  the particular ways 
in which the world – including human being – is mechanically conditioned 
and determined through external causation (e.g. the moving forces of  the 
objects of  desire). 
 Let us now take a look at Jacobi's metaphysical demonstration of  the 
way in which human being can be said to be free. 
 
“Der Mensch hat Freiheit” 
Jacobi's demonstration of  human freedom is fundamentally premised by the 
notion that it is as undeniable that the existence of  every singular thing is 
supported by the existence of  other singular things, as it is undeniable that we 
22 
 
cannot imagine a wholly dependent thing. (Cf. Jacobi 2000, p. 17 (§XXIV)) 
Because we cannot even conceive of  a wholly dependent thing there must be 
an aspect of  'pure self-activity' to every singular thing, whether it be 
mechanically or otherwise mediated. Again, Jacobi borrows some of  the 
conceptual logic of  Spinoza's Ethics. In the vocabulary of  Spinoza himself  
this pure self-activity is given the name of  'Natura naturans'. Together with 
the notion of  'Natura naturata', 'Natura naturans' constitutes the dual aspect 
of  Spinoza's ontological immanence. In the first book of  Ethics Spinoza 
himself  determines 'Natura naturans' in the following way: 
 
[B]y Natura naturans we must understand what is in itself  and is conceived through 
itself, or such attributes of  substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, that is, 
God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause. (Spinoza 1996, p. (IP29Schol.)) 
 
Now, this “reine Selbst-tätigkeit”, as Jacobi calls it, cannot itself  be known by 
man, because every clear and distinct idea – that is, all knowledge – rests on 
the speculative 'mediation' of  the causal reciprocity of  singular things. (Jacobi 
2000, p. 172 (§XXVI-XXVII)) While we cannot rationally come to know the 
very 'possibility' of  self-activity by means of  mediation, the 'reality' of  self-
activity is proven by every act that immediately determines itself  and therefore 
exists as conscious content. According to Jacobi, 'freedom' is the word that 
denominates the reality of  self-activity. (Cf. ibid., p.173 (§XXVIII-XXX)) As 
far as we know, writes Jacobi, it is only 'human beings' that are sufficiently 
aware of  self-activity in order to be driven to master and perform acts of  
freedom. (Cf. ibid., (§XXXI)) (Thus, it becomes clear that in it's minimal 
determination Jacobi's conception of  freedom bares some similarity with 
Hegel's later development of  his conception of  freedom. As it turned out, for 
Hegel, freedom is consciousness of  freedom. (Cf. Houlgate 2005, p. 27)) 
 Further, freedom is determined as the will's independence of  desire, 
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which is in its own turn determined as the elevation of  pure self-activity to 
reason. (Cf. Jacobi 2000, p. 173 (§XXXII-XXXIII)) Jacobi traces the source 
of  the consciousness of  freedom – and the actual acts of  freedom that flow 
from it – back to the Stoics' conception of  'honour', whose sole object 
consists in “die Vollkommenheit der menschlichen Natur an sich, Selbsttätigkeit, 
Freiheit.” (Ibid., p. 174) Honour urges human being to freedom by installing a 
responsiveness towards itself, whereby human being becomes a freely acting 
thing in accordance with itself. In opposition to such a freely self-determining 
human being, there are those who are merely determined by contingent 
desires and random whims. (Cf. ibid., p. 173-174 (§XXXV)) As Jacobi himself  
puts it: 
 
So lange aber noch ein Funken dieses Gefühl [i.e. the feeling of  honour] im 
Menschen wohnt, so lange ist ein unwidersprechliches Zeugnis der Freiheit, ein 
unbezwinglicher Glaube an die innerliche Allmacht des Willens in ihm. (Ibid., p. 174) 
 
Even though it is obviously possible for human being to oppose the reality of  
freedom by means of  stubborn linguistic refutation, we cannot, according to 
Jacobi, not hearken to and in our actions comply with the profound and 
abyssal call of  freedom when it comes to our administration of  our own 
reputation as well as our judgment of  the worth of  other people. Whenever 
we encounter and experience a human being that squanders its chances, 
chooses the wrong means to its ends and all in all acts in contrast to its own 
ideals, dreams, wishes and wants, we judge it as an unreasonable and 
downright foolish human being. (Cf. ibid., p. 175 (§XXXVII)) Jacobi writes 
further that the feeling of  honour is so deeply rooted in human being that we 
are only capable of  really condemning another human being when it shows 
clear signs of  having lost its feeling of  honour and, thus, its self-respect. As he 




Verleugnet [der Mensch] aber auf  irgend eine entschiedene Weise das Gefühl der 
Ehre; zeigt er, dass er innere Schande tragen, oder Selbstverachtung nicht mehr fühlen 
kann; dann werfen wir ihn ohne Gnade weg, er ist Kot unter unseren Füssen. (Ibid., 
p. 175) 
 
After loosely criticizing Spinoza for having committed a purely abstract 
demonstration of  the incapacity of  a rational human being to lie – even in the 
situation where lying could potentially save the life of  the human being in 
question – Jacobi goes on to assert that there must belong another essential 
aspect to human being than there merely syllogistic one, i.e. the aspect that has 
to do with deductive reasoning and logical inferences. This other essential 
aspect, Jacobi names “den Odem Gottes in dem Gebilde von Erde.” (Ibid., p. 
176) Thus, for Jacobi, in all its earthly manifestation human being is thus, 
literally speaking, 'inspired' by God. Jacobi needs God in order to secure 
human freedom, because, for him, the belief  in intelligent, rational self-
determination logically entails the belief  in a highest intelligence or reason, a 
rational author, legislator or 'Urheber' of  nature, and the name that Jacobi 
chooses for this divine source and instigator of  human rationality turns out to 
be nothing but the always available notion of  'God'. (Cf. ibid., p. 177 (§XLII)) 
The underlying reason for Jacobi's crucial inference is not hard to sound out: 
human being is an exceptional being due to its dual nature. On the one hand, 
human being belongs to the earthly existence of  nature, but on the other, it 
belongs to the heavenly realm of  God. At one and the same time, human 
being is 'natural' and 'divine'. What this means in practice is that human being 
possesses the ability to rationally act in such as way as to bring nature to serve 
the purposes of  human being itself  – instead of  the purposes of  nature. That 
a naturally occurring being possesses the special ability to commence 
otherwise unreal chains of  causality, i.e. the ability to take part in the ongoing 
rearrangement of  the objective state of  affairs, thus functioning as an earthly 
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lawgiver of  nature, Jacobi interprets as an indisputable sign of  the existence 
of  a rational, personal God. That we, human beings, have been created in the 
image of  God, is proven by every act of  freedom insofar as a free act is an 
infinitesimal repetition of  God's primal creation of  the world. Jacobi's 
conception of  human freedom is therefore seen to be based on the logic of  
the genesis creation narrative of  Christianity. 
 Human faith in such a (Christian) God is not brought about 
automatically. Instead, it must be cultivated and instigated as religion, and this 
it will only be insofar as that which Jacobi calls 'pure love' is developed in the 
hearts of  human beings. (Cf. ibid. (§XLIII)) With a fleeting reference to 
Socrates, Jacobi states that the object of  pure love is the immanent 'telos' (i.e. 
end) of  human being. Now, this takes us back to his treatment of  human 
being's feeling of  honour, that equally had the perfection or progressive 
development of  human being as its object. Pure love can be translated as 
'striving for autonomy', i.e. auto-determination, i.e. rational self-activity. Now, 
as already mentioned, for Jacobi, human being has a dual essence in the sense 
that human being carries in its core both the seed of  necessity (i.e. 
determination) and the seed of  freedom (i.e. auto-determination). Therefore, 
in addition to its membership of  the heavenly realm of  God, which enables 
human beings' defining acts of  freedom, human being is subjected to the laws 
of  nature and the contingency that pertains to the phenomenal realm of  
earthly existence. According to Jacobi, this bestows a 'double direction' upon 
the essence of  human being: ”Die Richtung auf  das Endliche ist der sinnliche 
Trieb oder das Prinzip der Begierde; die Richtung auf  das Ewige ist das 
intellektuelle Trieb, das Prinzip reiner Liebe.” (Ibid., p. 178) 
 Thus, we are presented with the ancient and age-old narrative of  
human being's double nature: human being as a puzzling union of  sensation 
and reasoning, finite egotistical desire and infinite cosmic love. Now, as 
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already suggested, Jacobi does not want to give rational grounds for the reality 
of  the divine aspect of  human being, but is, instead, satisfied by making 
reference to actually free acts of  human being as sufficient indication of  the 
reality of  freedom, self-activity and auto-determination. He does, however, 
present us with the illogical nonsensicality of  wanting to account for the 
conditions of  the unconditioned. (Cf. ibid. (§L)) 
 For Jacobi, due to its defining feeling of  honour, human being is 
characterised by the wish to know a kind of  joy that is not just a sort of  
superficial tickle: “einer Freude, die nicht blosser Kitzel sei.” (Ibid., p. 178) 
The actions of  human being that truly initiates new chains of  causality, i.e. the 
actions that participate in the lawgiving of  nature, is given the name of  'divine 
actions' by Jacobi, and the joy that accompanies such actions as the joy that 
God feels by his own existence. (Cf. ibid., p. 178-179 (§LI)) Whereas human 
being acquires the 'soul of  the animal' by directing its actions towards the 
purely phenomenal, earthly and contingent aspect of  reality, it acquires 
nothing less than 'immortality' by directing its actions towards the eternal and 
enduring. (Cf. ibid., p. 179 (§LII))  All in all, Jacobi's demonstration of  
the reality of  human freedom amounts, therefore, to nothing more than a vain 
repetition of  the Christian conception of  human being draped in the logical 
rigour of  philosophical sounding phrases. For Jacobi, nature – understood as 
the earthly realm of  necessity – and freedom – understood as the heavenly 
realm of  God – ought to be thought of  as essentially dichotomous. They 
cannot be reconciled, but must instead be thought of  as the two poles of  a 
dualistic spectrum characteristic of  the existence of  singular things including 
human being. Insofar as Jacobi takes his demonstration of  human being's 
radical lack of  freedom to be exhaustive and fully representative of  Spinoza's 
metaphysics, he will be shown to be wrongheaded in his exegetically unrefined 
one-sidedness. As we will now move on to see, Spinoza offers a metaphysics 
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of  freedom that qualifies both of  the above mentioned aspects of  reality and 
human being as crucial to the reality of  freedom. 
 
3. Spinoza's Response 
Interestingly, despite Jacobi's overall assessment of  Spinoza's philosophy as 
ultimately inadequate and unsatisfactory due to its deterministic and fatalistic 
metaphysical content that he takes to flow from Spinoza's rationalistic mode 
of  thinking and presentation, Jacobi's own demonstration of  human freedom 
and the religious premises that support it, bares much similarity with Spinoza's 
thinking through and presentation of  the possibility of  human freedom. The 
ontological structure that follows from the consistent conceptual development 
of  human freedom – i.e. that the human joy that accompanies free actions 
coincides with God's joy by his own existence – is rediscovered almost word 
for word in the fifth and last book of  Ethics: ”The mind's intellectual love of  
God is the very love of  God by which God loves himself  […].” (Spinoza 
1996, p. 176 (VP36)) 
 What made Jacobi feel justified in his determination of  Spinoza's 
philosophy as deterministic, fatalistic and thus, ultimately, nihilistic, now seems 
to be nothing but a radical misunderstanding of  Spinoza's philosophy. Many a 
place in Ethics Spinoza makes it clear that the condition of  possibility of  
freedom is nothing but knowledge of  created nature (i.e. 'Natura naturata') in 
terms of  determined and thus necessary things that externally affect, 
condition and thus determine human being to act in certain passionate ways. 
(Cf. e.g. ibid., p. 165 (VP6) and 169 (VP15)) For Spinoza, then, there cannot 
be said to be any dichotomous relation between freedom and necessity. On 
the contrary, the road to freedom is paved with the acknowledgement of  one's 
own determination. Or, to put it in the words of  Spinoza himself: ”Insofar as 
the mind understands all things as necessary, it has a greater power over the affects, or is 
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less acted on by them.” (Ibid., p. 165 (VP6)) (Due to his radical conception of  the 
logical interdependence between freedom and necessity, Spinoza can be said 
to have cleared the way for some of  the central thoughts of  German idealism. 
It is even possible to find linguistically similar ways of  phrasing the relation 
between freedom and necessity in Hegel's works. That the acknowledgement 
of  necessity and determination is the condition of  possibility of  freedom and 
auto-determination is even presented in an almost slogan-like manner in the 
third volume of  his Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften: “[V]on seiner 
Schranke wissen heisst daher, von seiner Unbeschränktheit wissen.” (Hegel 
1986c, p. 36) Or, as he puts it in the chapter on 'spirit' ('Geist') in 
Phänomenologie des Geistes: ”Nur als empörtes Selbstbewusstsein aber weiss es 
[i.e. the self] seine eigene Zerrissenheit, und in diesem Wissen derselben hat es 
sich unmittelbar darüber erhoben.” (Hegel 1986d, p. 390)) 
 The same ontological structure that expresses the logical culmination 
of  Spinoza's immanent metaphysics of  freedom, emerges, as we have seen, in 
Jacobi's demonstration of  human freedom. Freedom is determined by him as 
well, as human being's ability to act as lawgiver of  nature, which can only take 
place insofar as the objective state of  affairs are rationally thought through as 
regards to their total causality. The power to rearrange the objective state of  
affairs so that they are brought to serve other (e.g. human) purposes, is 
bestowed upon human being by the rational capability of  knowledge of  
causality. 
 Now, in order to stay true to his philosophical intention, that is, in 
order to attain conceptual consistency, Spinoza must let his philosophical 
magnum opus begin with the seemingly paralysing mechanistic discourse that 
dominates the first book of  Ethics. Jacobi's blatant misunderstanding of  
Spinoza's philosophy might have been caused by his simply not making it to 
the second, third, fourth and fifth books of  Ethics, but instead contented 
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himself  with simply dealing with the content and style of  the first of  the five 
books, which, when read on its own, can indeed mislead the reader to 
conclude that Spinoza had nothing but wheels and gears in mind when he 
wrote his now classic text. Another reason might have been Jacobi's general 
tendency towards conservatism and theism. (Cf. Baum 2002) However, and 
independently of  what the cause for Jacobi's misinterpretation of  Spinoza's 
great book actually was, a much more organic and dynamic conception of  
reality emerges as soon as we begin to listen to the subtler themes of  the 
grandiose symphony entitled Ethics. 
 Instead of  confronting the logical implications of  his demonstration of  
human freedom and stipulating an impersonal, immanent ontological concept 
like the one historically introduced, deductively justified and given the name 
of  'God or Nature' ('deus sive natura') by Spinoza (cf. Spinoza 1996, p. 114 
(IVPreface)), Jacobi flees into the irrational dogmas of  Christianity, and thus 
renders himself  a victim to that which Spinoza calls 'education', and which 
Jacobi himself  did not manage to rationally free himself  from and thus 
existentially overcome. As Spinoza puts it: 
 
[W]e ought also to note here that it is no wonder sadness follows absolutely all those 
acts which from custom are called wrong, and joy, those which are called right. For 
from what has been said above we easily understand that this depends chiefly on 
education. Parents – by blaming the former acts, and often scolding their children on 
account of  them, and on the other hand, by recommending and praising the latter 
acts – have brought it about that emotions of  sadness were joined to the one kind of  
act, and those of  joy to the other. Experience itself  also confirms this. For not 
everyone has the same custom and religion. On the contrary, what among some is 
holy, among others is unholy; and what among some is honorable, among others is 
dishonorable. Hence, according as each one has been educated, so he either repents 
of  a deed or exults at being esteemed for it. (Ibid., p. 108 (DEFINITIONS OF THE 
AFFECTS XXVIIExp.), my emphasis.) 
 
I will now go on to explicate Spinoza's doctrine of  freedom in order to 1) 
further account for the philosophically unsatisfactory aspects of  Jacobi's 
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demonstration of  human freedom as well as 2) further develop Spinoza's own 
conception of  the relation between objects and freedom. 
 To begin with, it is crucial that Spinoza's conception of  'affect' be made 
clear. At the beginning of  the third book of  Ethics Spinoza defines 'affect' in 
the following way: 
 
By affect I understand affections of  the body by which the body's power of  acting is 
increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of  these 
affections. Therefore, if  we can be the adequate cause of  any of  these affections, I understand by 
the affect an action; otherwise, a passion. (Ibid., p. 70 (IIID3)) 
 
Or, as Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss has put it in his fine and 'down to 
earth' history of  philosophy: 
 
In the third book [of  Ethics] we are introduced to the villain: the road to the clarity 
of  knowledge and happiness is not only hindered by ignorance, [...] but human being 
is all too susceptible to external impressions that set the mind in such oscillations 
that the equilibrium is lost whereby it is made to perform – and made to insist on 
performing – actions that lead to unhappiness. The passions prevent human being 
from unfolding itself  in a free and versatile way. (Næss 1963, p. 179-180) 
 
According to Spinoza, 'joy', 'desire' and 'sadness' are the three fundamental 
affects that are capable of  determining a human being. (Cf. Spinoza 1996, p. 
77 (IIIP11Schol.)) Whereas joy enables free actions, sadness shackles human 
being and determines it by means of  external causation to do things that do 
not necessarily agree with the nature of  the human being in question. Human 
being is directed by foreign, obscure and unknown forces as long as it is not 
determined by joyful affections due to rational self-determination. For 
Spinoza, freedom is to be understood as a boon to human being, as 
something to be treasured and held dear. Whereas it befalls some to act freely 
by means of  joyful affections, others are deprived of  the privilege of  
autonomy. In other words: human being is primarily and from the outset 
31 
 
dominated by contingency, and thus, consequently, necessity. Human being is 
not, according to Spinoza, free to choose freedom at will, but is, one might say, 
sentenced to be free under certain benign circumstances. As he himself  puts it 
in relation to his determination of  the causal relation between the intellect and 
the body: 
 
[W]hen men say that this or that action of  the body arises from the mind, which has 
dominion over the body, they do not know what they are saying, and they do nothing 
but confess, in fine-sounding words, that they are ignorant of  the true cause of  that 
action, and that they do not wonder at it. […] Those, therefore, who believe that they 
either speak or are silent, or do anything from a free decision of  the mind, dream 
with open eyes. (Ibid., p. 72-74 (IIIP2Schol.)) 
 
To develop this notion of  what might be called 'the heteronomy of  autonomy' 
– i.e. the contingent and objective source of  the conditions of  possibility of  
freedom – we might note in passing that, for Spinoza, adequate ideas or true 
knowledge cannot restrain or hinder the influence of  an affect simply by 
being adequate or true. (Cf. ibid., p. 123 (IVP14)) Only insofar as ideas or 
knowledge have an affective force in relation to the human being whose 
intellect gave rise to the ideas or knowledge in question can they restrain or 
hinder an affective determination. Thus, human being must already have been 
brought to be affectively receptive to the adequacy or truthfulness of  ideas in 
order for the rational workings of  the intellect to be able to have a power over 
the actions of  human being at all. And insofar as this have been brought 
about by the means of  'education' – understood in the broad sense, as 
characterised above – and experience, human being possesses the power of  
autonomy thanks to its rational capabilities of  affecting itself  by means of  the 
willed formation of  ideas. 
 Now, while it is not possible to determine a finite and definitive set of  
possible effects of  any singular thing, it is possible to characterise the likely 
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affective outcome of  the encounter with certain extreme things. Domestic 
violence, systematic bullying and physical abuse will tend to have an affective 
impact in the general direction of  sadness. Mental states such as demotivation, 
low self-esteem, psychological trauma and paralysation are all likely to follow 
in the wake of  such things. On the other hand, mental states such as zest and 
vigour are likely to be brought about by things such as healthy food, energetic 
friendships, parental love, a good night's sleep and creative stimulation. On a 
daily basis we make reference to things by using the same wording, but the 
things in question whose names we all agree upon, will necessarily take on a 
host of  different effects depending on who is affected by them and under 
what circumstances the affection takes place. Thus, to give an example, the 
Danish author Søren Aabye Kierkegaard's (1813-1855) classic piece of  
philosophical literature Either-or from 1843 might in some instances bring 
about joyful affections, but in other instances sad ones. At a certain point in 
the unfolding of  the existential narrative, Kierkegaard's persona Assessor 
Wilhelm writes the following: “Already prior to one's choosing, the personality 
is interested in the choice, and if  one puts off  the choice, the personality or 
the obscure forces within it unconsciously chooses.” (Kierkegaard 1962, p. 
155) Due to its obvious reference to the inevitability of  choice Kierkegaard's 
seminal text is capable of  affecting the reader towards self-confrontation and 
possibly even aesthetically seduce him/her to make an effort and attempt to 
take responsibility of  his/her existence. This kind of  literary aesthetic 
seduction will, possibly, lead to joyful affection and thus, ultimately, free 
actions. Those, on the other hand, that are not seduced by the Kierkegaardian 
deceptions will have a radically different experience when affected by his 
famous work. They might experience the read as an absurd desert journey 
with no significant meaning attached to it, and they will, therefore, suffer the 
affections of  sadness. 
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 There are no safe routes to joy, no existential regularities regarding 
which singular things lead to which affective states, and therefore human 
being is sentenced to exploration and discovery as regards what works under 
which conditions, and, for Spinoza, the vessel of  such exploration and 
discovery is 'reason'. But because of  the fact that the affectivity of  reason is 
itself  governed by the mess of  reality, i.e. contingency, there are no guarantees 
for human being to ever develop this divine aspect of  its existence. Despite 
the fact that our social institutions, e.g. the primary school system, is meant to 
facilitate a certain amount of  existential formation, the introduction to the 
whims and woes of  living as well as a partial obliteration of  the significance 
of  the respective pupil's socio-economic background as regards the life 
chances of  every single pupil, it remains nonetheless true what French 
philosopher and Spinoza-scholar Gilles Deleuze once proclaimed: “In the 
state of  nature I live at the mercy of  encounters.” (Deleuze 2005, p. 260) 
Now, that which is capable of  encountering something else, is always to be 
regarded as a singular thing. The question, therefore, becomes: what, for 
Spinoza, are 'singular things'? Or, to put it in another way: how to reconcile 
IP15 and VP24 of  Ethics? 
 On the one hand, God or Nature is said not to be corporeal (cf. 
Spinoza 1996, p. 10 (IP15Schol.), but on the other hand, Spinoza claims, the 
more we understand singular things, the more we understand God or Nature. 
(Cf. ibid., p. 173 (VP24)) How can this be? In order to answer this question, 
we must consult the opening definitions of  the second book of  Ethics where 
'singular things' are defined: 
 
By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate 
existence. And if  a number of  individuals so concur in one action that together they 
are all the cause of  one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular 




– this is also true of  what Spinoza calls 'bodies'. (Cf. ibid., p. 42 
(IIL3A2Definition)) What Spinoza has in mind is that singular things exist on 
a range of  different levels where the relations between parts and wholes are 
dynamic and ever changing depending on the total causality that dominates 
the reciprocity of  things that defines the objective state of  affairs. Imagine a 
mill. A mill consists of  a host of  different singular things, and when 
combined in a specific way those singular things join together in the make up 
of  such a thing as a 'mill'. Traditionally, the main effect produced by a mill has 
been 'the grinding of  grain' or 'the making of  flour', but in rare occasions it 
has been 'the destruction of  sprockets and v-belts' due to the excessive 
tension brought about by the input of  unusually hard grains of, for instance, 
wheat. Thus, what I have referred to as 'total causality' is prone to change 
when singular things otherwise absent are introduced into the workings of  
relatively stable assemblages of  things. (I will return to the example of  the mill 
in the section on Harman's response to Jacobi's dilemma.) 
 Insofar as the knowledge of  singular things leads to the formation of  
an adequate idea of  God or Nature, ought not also God or Nature to be 
ascribed the status of  a finite, singular thing? Spinoza often defines God or 
Nature as the cause of  all things (see, for instance, ibid., p. 18 (IP24Cor.)), and 
God or Nature cannot, therefore, itself  be ascribed the status of  a thing, i.e. 
an effect, amongst other things, i.e. effects. (Ibid., p. 16 (IP18) and p. 18 
(IP24)) In one place, Spinoza characterises the existence of  singular things as 
determined by what he calls ”the order of  the whole of  corporeal Nature.” 
(Ibid., p. 7 (IP11Dem.)) Thus, as far as singular things are concerned, Spinoza 
operates with a radical ontological heteronomy, which entails that singular 
things only cause other singular things to arise, change or perish thanks to the 
causation of  other singular things. The causal power of  singular things is 
nothing but the surface effect of  prior events of  causation. Or, to quote a 
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passage stylistically typical of  Spinoza: 
 
Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can 
neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist 
and produce an effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate 
existence; and again, this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to produce 
an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another, which is 
also finite and has a determinate existence, and os on, to infinity. (Ibid., p. 19 (IP28)) 
 
It therefore makes sense to use the metaphor of  'the great chain of  being' in 
relation to the implicit chronology of  existence that is implied by, what might 
be called, Spinoza's proposed 'ontological successiveness'. The consequence 
of  this doctrine of  ontological successiveness is that the only way to 
consistently conceive of  freedom in relation to human being is by way of  
reference to the mode of  necessity that dominates the existence of  singular 
things insofar as they are conceived under the aspect of  created nature (i.e. 
'Natura naturata'). On a theoretical level, human being is set free by employing 
reason to know the ways in which singular things are causally linked. That is, 
by forming adequate ideas about the singular things that are affectively 
significant in relation to the state and condition of  human being. The degree 
of  adequacy of  any given idea depends on the level of  detail and the amount 
of  nuances that the idea in question expresses. The higher the level of  detail 
and the larger the amount of  nuances expressed by an idea, the freer human 
being becomes depending on the degree of  rational receptiveness displayed by 
the mind who authored the idea. On a practical level, freedom – thus acquired 
– is realised to the extent to which the human being whose mind has been 
affected by the relatively adequate idea of  certain singular and affectively 
significant things, is capable of  channelling the power of  the rationally 
produced insights into the objective state of  affairs into actions rearranging 
the order of  things, thus initiating new chains of  causality that changes the 
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overall affectivity of  the total causality in which the human being in question 
takes part. Spinoza's conception of  freedom is therefore to be understood in 
terms of  human being's capacity to be affected in accordance with its own 
nature. (Cf. ibid., p. 166 (VP10)) Because the power to determine oneself  (i.e. 
freedom) flows from the knowledge of  one's current determination (i.e. 
necessity), it makes good sense to talk about seemingly paradoxical notions 
such as 'the necessity of  freedom' and 'the heteronomy of  autonomy'. 
 Now, in order to illustrate these rather abstract points concerning 
Spinoza's conception of  the relation between singular things, reason and 
freedom, let us take a look at some of  the examples he himself  gives in the 
fifth and final book of  Ethics. To begin with, it follows logically from what has 
already been made apparent that such a thing as 'hope' – or, at least, the need 
for it – vanishes as soon as human being has begun to determine itself  by 
means of  reason. When one knows that this or that is not good for one's 
overall condition or state of  being, then one does no longer need hope in 
order to get along. One simply rejoices in the causal power of  the knowledge 
one has brought about by means of  the capacity of  reason to produce 
adequate ideas of  singular things taking part of  the total causality of  which 
one is oneself  merely a part among parts. Translated into the language of  
general wisdom, Spinoza puts it in the following way: 
 
[T]he more we strive to live according to the guidance of  reason, the more we strive 
to depend less on hope, to free ourselves from fear, to conquer fortune as much as 
we can, and to direct our actions by the certain counsel of  reason. […] He who 
rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of  the divine nature, and 
happen according to the eternal laws and rules of  Nature, will surely find nothing 
worthy of  hate, mockery, or disdain, nor anyone whom he will pity. Instead he will 
strive, as fas as human virtue allows, to act well, as they say, and rejoice. (Ibid., p. 141-
142 (IVP47-50)) 
 
In order to illustrate this rather abstract expression of  the ethical implications 
of  Spinoza's philosophy, let us take a look at another passage from the fourth 
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part of  Ethics that, at least to some extent, foreshadows the desire to translate 
abstract, conceptual philosophising into surprisingly specific advice, that 
would later manifest itself  in the late Nietzsche's rambling Ecce Homo from 
1888: 
 
It is the part of  a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself  in moderation with 
pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of  green plants, with 
decoration, music, sports, the theatre, and other things of  this kind, which anyone 
can use without injury to another. For the human body is composed of  a great many 
parts of  different natures, which constantly require new and varied nourishment, so 
that the whole body may be equally capable of  all the things which can follow from 
its nature, and hence, so that the mind also may be equally capable of  understanding 
many things at once. (Ibid., p. 140-141 (IVP45Schol.)) 
 
It is important to underline that Spinoza's well-meant moments of  existential 
counselling ought to be understood as general advice that, all things being 
equal, does make good sense to adapt for most human beings. The fact that 
some people simply 'hate' going to the theatre, because they suffer an 
affection of  sadness from the theatrical experience, should not be interpreted 
as an indication of  their not directing their actions by 'the certain counsel of  
reason' due to the fact that Spinoza, the rational philosophy par excellence, once 
recommended his readers to engage in theatrical shows. On the contrary, such 
an avoidance of  the theatre might just as well be an expression of  exactly 
rational self-determination if  the failure to be joyfully affected by theatrical 
impressions has been rationally thought through and thus demonstrated to be 
an inherent trait of  one's overall psychological dispositions. If  one or one's 
doctor/psychiatrist is thus capable of  rationally diagnosing oneself/one with a 
rare case of  'theatrophobia', then one's systematic avoidance of  theatres 
cannot rightfully be said to be an expression of  one's unfree and irrational 
state of  being. (In the fifth book of  Ethics Spinoza meticulously deducts a 
host of  other specific ethical implications of  rational self-determination, but I 
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will not go into detail with his treatment of  such things as 'humility', 'self-
esteem', 'fear', 'desire', 'pity', 'repentance' and 'hate' due to the overall scope 
and focus of  my paper. It suffices that I have now duly laid out Spinoza's 
conception of  the relation between singular things, reason and freedom.) 
 Now, in conclusion, the main problem of  Jacobi's overall assessment of  
Spinoza's philosophy stems from the fact that he (i.e. Jacobi) was not able to 
merge the concepts of  'freedom' and 'necessity' into a higher and 
philosophically more refined understanding of  human being as well as the 
intricate relation between freedom and the capacity for rational mediation of  
the objective state of  affairs. Because he could not fathom that knowledge of  
necessity constitutes the basis of  freedom, Jacobi was left with an apparent 
either-or situation where he, ultimately, chose the cop out of  a religious leap 
of  faith instead of  soberly taking upon himself  the speculatively strenuous 
effort of  philosophy. As we shall see, it was not until the emergence of  the 
philosophy of  the mature Hegel that German philosophy was in a position to 
merge the two phenomena of  'freedom' and 'necessity' in a dialectically 
satisfying manner. (Jacobi's deficient conception of  the relation between 
freedom and necessity is apparent in, for instance, §XXVI of  his Über die 
Freiheit des Menschen. There Jacobi writes that every singular thing “in so fern 
ihr Sein und Wirken vermittelt ist, in so fern muss es schlechterdings auf  
Gesetze des Mechanismus beruhen.” (Jacobi 2000, p. 172)) As we have seen in 
the case of  Spinoza, rational mediation of  singular things does not lead to 
mechanical necessity, but is instead the road to freedom. As we shall see, 
Jacobi's conception of  the mechanical nature of  mediation is the diametrical 
opposite of  not just Spinoza's understanding of  mediation, but also of  
Hegel's. 
 Finally, for Spinoza 'God or nature' must be conceived as essentially 
free, insofar as we take 'God or nature' to refer to all of  the attributes and 
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modes of  the one true substance, which, according to Spinoza, is the only 
thing that can be understood in and through itself  without having to make 
reference to other concepts. (Cf. Spinoza 1996, p. 1 (ID1)) Through the use 
of  reason human being is capable of  existing 'substantially' insofar as rational 
self-determination enables human being to transcend the specific 
determinations of  the total causality of  the mesh of  singular things into 
which it has always already been weaved. The logic of  Spinoza's metaphysics 
of  freedom entails the following attitude towards the tripartite meaning of  the 
title of  my article: 1) freedom is singular things' (e.g. human being's) rational 
overcoming of  determination qua external causation of  other singular things, 
2) under the reign of  freedom nature is to be conceived as the total causality 
of  singular things, and 3) nature understood as 'God or nature' is that which is 
ultimately free insofar as it is the very incarnation of  substance with all of  its 
attributes, modes and affections. 
 Let us now move on to take a look at Hegel's conception of  the 
relation between nature and freedom, and give voice to the philosophical 
attitude towards Jacobi's dilemma that follows from his systematic thinking. 
 
4. Hegel's Response 
In his introduction to the second volume of  the comprehensive Enzyklopädie, 
Hegel expresses his overall conception of  'nature': “Was ist die Natur? Sie 
bleibt ein Problem.” (Hegel 1986b, p. 12) For Hegel, nature remains 
'problematic' because, for him, 'nature' designates the natural world insofar as it 
has been named and thus made to appear before the eyes of  cultured human 
being. Everything natural rests, so to speak, in the eye of  the beholder. 'In 
itself', though, nature cannot 'be said' to be anything at all, due to the fact that 
insofar as we experience, think or talk about what nature might be 'in itself', 
human concepts have already been engaged in the exposition of  the objective 
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state of  affairs, thus turning it into a subjective negation of  nature's 
immediate being. Every subjective negation expresses an interest, a goal or a 
purpose, and for this reason, the category of  'end' ('Zweck') dialectically 
emerges in Hegel's logical determination of  the concept of  'object' in his 
Wissenschaft der Logik. As an implication of  the event of  knowledge human 
being qua subject conceptually appropriates the available and ontologically 
malleable realm of  reality that exists beyond the scope of  concepts, and which 
is thus turned into 'objectivity' in the shape of  what Hegel calls “die 
äusserliche Allgemeinheit.” (Hegel 1986a, p. 355) Nature, for Hegel, in all its 
external generality is therefore not be considered as anything else than what 
might be called 'petrified intelligence', to borrow the wording of  Alison Stone. 
(Cf. Stone 2005) The source of  generality is 'reason', understood as the faculty 
of  ontological significance, i.e. conceptual conditioning of  the objective state 
of  affairs. Now, 'understanding' is the name of  the human capacity for 
employing the generalities of  reason in the realm of  objectivity. (Cf. Hegel 
1986a., p. 169) Whereas understanding is limited by “das abstrakte Entweder-
Oder” (ibid., p. 172) that Hegel takes to be a characteristic trait of  youngsters 
and philosophically uneducated people, reason is free to work out the 
speculative unity of  apparently opposite generalities by means of  
presuppositionless dialectics, thereby grasping the reciprocity and cohesion of  
the categories of  understanding, hence of  objectivity itself. (Cf. ibid., p. 168) 
 Now, before I move on to further clarify the relation between 
objectivity, reason and freedom within the parameters of  Hegel's philosophy, 
it is crucial that the concept of  'dialectics' is itself  determined. As Hegel 
himself  reminds us: “Das Dialektische gehörig aufzufassen und zu erkennen 
ist von der höchsten Wichtigkeit.” (Ibid., p. 173) To begin with, 'dialectics' 
entails an 'immanent' starting point of  philosophical knowing. This means 
that no predetermined concepts or notions are needed in order for the 
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process of  philosophy to get going. Nothing but sheer immediacy makes up, 
so to speak, the starting point of  Hegel's ontology. (Cf. ibid., p. 182-183) 
Thanks to the three 'sides' of  logic, which manifest themselves in the 
dialectical unfolding of  the ontologically significant categories of  human 
being, i.e. 1) the abstract side, 2) the dialectical side, and 3) the speculative 
side, pure thinking in terms of  reason's engagement with the abstract thought 
determinations of  understanding is capable of  thinking through the intricate 
web of  concepts that make up the structural conditions of  possibility of  
phenomena and, therefore, of  objectivity itself. 
 It is important, therefore, not to conflate Kant's and Hegel's respective 
positions as regards the metaphysical make up of  reality. Whereas Kant 
thought of  the transcendental conditioning of  objective reality by means of  
the synthetic capabilities of  the faculty of  reason on the one hand, and 
amorphous things in themselves on the other, in terms of  what Harman calls 
“the Kantian duopoly of  human and world” (Harman 2011, p. 46), Hegel 
thought of  the relation between human conception and the objective state of  
affairs in terms of  an immanent coincidence where there simply are no 
objects prior to their inscription in the web of  concepts – what Hegel calls 
'the notion' ('der Begriff'). (Cf. Hegel 1986d, p. 76-77) Thus, Hegel – in 
contrast to Kant – does not stipulate the existence of  some autonomous, 
noumenal realm of  reality devoid of  the constitutive influence of  human 
being. For him, things can only be 'for us' due to the simple reason that 
insofar as we entertain the notion of  'things in themselves' the things thus 
talked or thought about as beings 'in themselves' have already been made to 
appear as 'things for us'. Therefore, 'things in themselves' ought really to be 
referred to as 'things in themselves for us', whereby the conceptual 
determination of  things in themselves as things 'in themselves' negates itself  
by being presuppositionlessly thought through by the use of  reason. (Cf. 
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Hegel 1986a, p. 116 and 254-255) 
 Now, in order to clarify Hegel's conception of  the intimate connection 
between objects, reason and freedom, it is important to introduce Hegel's 
conception of  human being as 'spirit' ('Geist'). Human being's capacity for 
freedom stems from the fact that human being is 'spirit', i.e. self-determining 
through knowledge of  self. As Hegel puts it in the third volume of  his 
Enzyklopädie: ”Dass der Geist dazu kommt, zu wissen, was er ist, dies macht 
seine Realisation aus. Der Geist ist wesentlich nur das, was er von sich selber 
weiss.” (Hegel 1986c, p. 33) The knowledge of  self  ('Sichwissen') that 
characterises spirit is mediated through a host of  categories that collectively 
make up the total notion of  reality. These defining categories of  human being 
qua spirit are normally 'unconsciously' active (cf.  Hegel 1986f, p. 24), 
wherefore it is a matter of  philosophical work to lay out the ontologically 
significant modes of  knowing that characterise human being in its immediacy. 
On multiple occasions Hegel makes it crystal clear that the business of  
philosophy has to do with the enlightening task of  sounding out the 
conceptual determinations of  things, because for him the very essence of  
objectivity is thoughts, or to use his own way of  putting it, 'thought 
determinations'. (Cf. Hegel 1986a, p. 81) It therefore follows that “die 
Aufgabe der Philosophie [besteht überhaupt darin] die Dinge auf  Gedanken, 
und zwar auf  bestimmte Gedanken zurückzuführen.” (Ibid., p. 220) Hegel's 
belief  in the radical correlation between the logical content of  thinking and 
the being of  things in themselves is unequivocally expressed in the first 
volume of  his Enzyklopädie: “[D]ie wahre Objektivität des Denkens [ist] diese, 
dass die Gedanken nicht bloss unsere Gedanken, sondern zugleich das Ansich 
der Dinge und des Gegenständlichen überhaupt sind.” (Ibid., p. 116) The 
programmatic implications of  this conception of  the relation between 
thought and being is further developed by Hegel. From his understanding of  
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human being's relation to the objective state of  affairs it follows that human 
being is itself  driven by a striving to subject reality to the idealising faculties of  
understanding and reason. Therefore, Hegel concludes, human being is 
determined by the defining drive “die Welt zu erkennen, sie sich anzueignen 
und zu unterwerfen, und zu dem Ende muss die Realität der Welt gleichsam 
zerquetscht, d. h. idealisiert werden.” (Ibid., 118 – my emphasis.) 
 To say that the world must be 'crushed' ('zerquetscht'), in order for it to 
be known and appropriated at all, reveals an implicit tendency in Hegel's 
intellectual orientation. The philosophical significance of  human being's 
random yet fateful encounters with the multiplicity of  singular things that, 
according to Spinoza, govern reality in general and human being in particular, 
is substantially downplayed by Hegel in order for the ontological primacy of  
human being's conceptual conditioning of  objective reality to emerge. The 
notion of  human being as driven by the will to subject the world to its 
idealising generalities in order for the world to become ever more attuned to 
human being is itself  reflected, by Hegel, into the ontological hierarchy of  
reality: “Der Begriff  ist vielmehr das wahrhaft Erste, und die Dinge sind das, 
was sie sind, durch die Tätigkeit des ihnen innewohnenden und in ihnen sich 
offenbarenden Begriffs.” (Ibid., p. 313) It thus becomes clear that Hegel does 
not ascribe an ontological autonomy to what, as we saw, is called 'singular 
things' in Spinoza's terminology. Things are only the things they are thanks to 
the way in which human being comprehends them, wherefore they can only 
be assigned an ontologically speaking derivative status. Things are only relative 
to us, so to speak. The difference between Spinoza's and Hegel's respective 
conceptions of  the relation between nature and human being can therefore be 
phrased in the following way: whereas, for Spinoza, human being takes place 
at the mercy of  natural encounters, for Hegel natural encounters take place at 
the mercy of  human being. 
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 From this it follows that Hegel determines the purpose of  philosophy 
to be the systematic unfolding of  the specific ways in which human being 
crushes and appropriates the world by means of  the invocation of  
ontologically significant categories. Because 'language' is the means by which 
understanding gets to know and thus constitutes its respective objects (cf. 
Hegel 1986f, p. 20), Hegel's philosophical point of  departure is the vocabulary 
of  everyday consciousness – or, as he himself  puts it, the “unmittelbares 
Vorurteil eines jeden.” (Hegel 1986a, p. 79) 'Reason' thinks in terms of  the 
conditions of  that which is, i.e. thinks through the concepts that 
understanding merely invokes in its grasping of  objects of  experience, and 
therefore it now follows that what understanding takes to be real things, 
reason interprets as mere appearances. Hegel therefore points out the 
difference between philosophical thinking and everyday, common 
consciousness in the following way: “[D]ie Philosophie [unterscheidet] sich 
vom gemeinen Bewusstsein dadurch, dass sie dasjenige, was diesem als ein 
Seiendes und Selbständiges gilt, als blosse Erscheinung betrachtet.” (Ibid., p. 
262) Reason, therefore, can be said to operate on the level of  the conditions 
of  knowing, which is to say on the level of  the logical categories that 
permeate and animate understanding's use of  language. For Spinoza, reason 
primarily operates on the level of  being, bodies and/or singular things in 
relation to the achievement of  affective self-determination, and the contrast to 
Hegel's programmatic characterisation of  philosophy is therefore not hard to 
see. 
 Nonetheless, 'freedom' is also in the case of  Hegel intimately linked to 
the pursuit of  philosophy, because knowledge of  the conceptual conditions 
of  objectivity (i.e. the categorial content of  the notion) leads to knowledge of  
the limitations ('die Schranke') of  human being, which in turn is equivalent to 
transgressing those exact limitations by means of  truthful appropriation of  
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their inevitability. Not until human being confronts its ontological make up is 
human being set free to act in accordance with the actual spiritual essence of  
itself, and therefore to determine itself  as itself. For Hegel, it is only this 
recursive self-transparency as regards human being's invocation of  
ontologically significant categories that enables freedom to emerge in the 
realm of  human being. (Cf. Hegel 1986f, p. 27 and Houlgate 2005, p. 14-16) It 
is therefore important to note, in conclusion, that the source of  freedom, for 
Hegel, is the speculative knowledge of  the conceptual constitution of  things, 
and not of  the things themselves, and in this regard, his philosophical position 
stands in stark contrast to that of  Spinoza's. 
 The logic of  Hegel's ontology, and the derivative conception of  
freedom, entails the following attitude towards the tripartite meaning of  the 
title of  my article: 1) freedom is human being's rational self-determination as 
spirit through the dialectical sublation of  the ontologically significant and 
initially abstract categories of  language, 2) human freedom qua self-
determination as spirit implies that nature is to be seen as nothing but 
externalized generality and therefore ontologically heteronomous, and 3) 
nature understood as externalized generality is not itself  capable of  acts of  
freedom, but is only made to appear under the conceptual conditions of  
human knowing. 
 Let us now leave behind two of  the all time greats of  Western thinking, 
and take a look at what today's philosophical avant-garde has to offer in 
relation to the metaphysical conception of  the relation between object, 
thinking and freedom. The time has come to introduce the metaphysical 
position of  Graham Harman. 
 
5. Harman's Response 
In the wake of  French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux's (1967-) critique of  
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'correlationism', i.e. the Kantian paradigm of  philosophical thinking that 
restricts thinking from dealing with things in themselves (cf. Meillassoux 2009, 
p. 5), several of  the philosophers within the 'speculative realism'-movement 
have attempted to work out positive metaphysical positions of  their own. 
Whereas Meillassoux's critique served the merely negative purpose of  clearing 
the path for new projects of  ontology to emerge, philosophers like Graham 
Harman, Timothy Morton and Tristan Garcia have put forth positive 
ontologies that explore the truth and reality of  what Meillassoux termed 'the 
great outdoors', i.e. the world as it is independently of  the presence of  a 
knowing subject. (Cf. ibid., p. 7) In what follows I will expound the position 
of  Harman focusing on his conception of  objects, thinking and, derivatively, 
freedom under the headline of  'object-oriented ontology' (henceforth 
'OOO'), and I will do so using Harman's The Quadruple Object from 2011 as my 
primary source. 
 Philosophers, according to Harman, are “specialists in simplicity.” 
(Harman 2011, p. 78) By this characterisation he intends to point to the 
attempt of  philosophy “to look for basic overarching structures.” (Ibid.) 
Structures that, so to speak, are “found everywhere and at all times” (ibid., p. 
96), and which Harman calls 'tensions'. (Cf. ibid., p. 98-99 and 108-109) He 
distinguishes tensions from mere 'links' or 'relations', of  which he thinks there 
are only ten in number. (Cf. ibid., p. 78) As regards tensions there are four in 
number, hence Harman's revival of  Heidegger's infamous notion of  'the 
fourfold', which he (Harman) takes to be a much underestimated and sadly 
neglected philosophical concept. (Cf. ibid., p. 82-85) 
 Another trait that Harman takes to be characteristic of  philosophy is 
the fact that it always springs from a relatively small set of  fundamental ideas 
that implicitly govern the systematic laying out of  the philosophy in question. 
In an interview from 2009 Harman puts it in the following way: ”In my view, 
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to understand a philosophy means to grasp a handful of  basic intuitions from 
which the entire philosophy unfolds.” (Ennis (Red.) 2010, p. 6) 
 Now, the basic idea that animates the philosophy of  Harman is the 
following: no object ever exhausts the being of  another object. For this 
reason, I find it reasonable to assert that what I call 'non-exhaustion' is the key 
metaphysical concept of  Harman's OOO. But in order to justify this claim, I 
must first go through the concepts that he himself  invokes in order to 
metaphysically determine what an object really is. For explanatory reasons I 
will use two of  Harman's own figures as the point of  departure for my 
account of  his philosophical stance. The figures are taken from The Quadruple 
Object, which is the clearest presentation of  Harman's philosophy to date, even 
if  it is only laid out in rudimentary fashion. Concepts such as 'caricature' and 
'allure', which already played a central role in some of  his earlier works, will be 










FIGURE 7: Broken Links (Ibid., p. 107) 
 
The above figures present us with the four poles of  what Harman calls 'the 
new fourfold', which is to say his appropriation of  Heidegger's notorious 
'fourfold' ('Geviert') of  his late philosophy from 1949 onwards. (Cf. Harman 
2011, p. 82-83) Harman takes the concept of  the fourfold to be of  
philosophical necessity “once we acknowledge both the results of  Heidegger's 
potent tool-analysis and Husserl's breakthrough into the duel between a 
unified sensual object and its multitude of  profiles.” (Ibid., p. 95) Whereas 
Heidegger's tool-analysis entails “two basic modes of  being” (ibid., p. 39), 
Husserl's 'breakthrough' entails “two crucial tensions in the cosmos” (ibid., p. 
32). Whereas the two basic modes of  being of  Heidegger are 'tool' and 
'broken tool', the 'two crucial tensions' of  Husserl are the tensions between 1) 
sensual objects and their sensual qualities, and 2) sensual objects and their real 
qualities. Harman openly states that what he intends to do in his presentation 
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and qualification of  his own metaphysics of  objects is to draw consequences 
and sound out tacit implications of  what he takes to be Heidegger's and 
Husserl's core contributions to philosophy, and thus to expound the results of  
their philosophical investigations in ways that indeed would have seemed 
strange to both of  them, for, as he puts it, in the philosophies of  Heidegger 
and Husserl is found “the basic elements of  an object-oriented metaphysics.” 
(Ibid., p. 49) 
 In stark contrast to what Harman accounts for as the two dominating 
strategies of  philosophy, namely 'undermining' and 'overmining' – which 
reduces the object downwards and upwards respectively, leaving the object in 
a state of  radical heteronomy (cf. ibid., p. 8-13) – he defends the notion of  the 
ontological autonomy of  objects. Objects, according to Harman, are what 
they are irrespective of  the relations into which they enter – be it object-
object relations or object-subject relations. As he himself  puts it: 
 
The only way to do justice to objects is to consider that their reality is free of  all 
relation, deeper than all reciprocity. The object is a dark crystal veiled in a private 
vacuum: irreducible to its own pieces, and equally irreducible to its outward relations 
with other things. (Ibid., p. 47) 
 
The state of  'non-exhaustion' that characterise all things qua objects points, 
for Harman, in the direction of  the philosophically traditional category of  
'substance', when 'substance' is taken to signify ”the reality of  a thing, 
irreducible to any of  its relations or qualities”. (Harman 2010, p. 114 – see 
also Harman 2005, p. 78) Despite the fact that objects are infinitely withdrawn 
in “a shadowy subterranean realm” (Harman 2011, p. 37) or “a perpetually 
veiled underworld” (ibid., p. 39), Harman succeeds in philosophically 
justifying “four distinct poles in the universe” (ibid., p. 49), thus sounding out 
a fundamental structure of  the otherwise amorphous substance of  objects. 
These are 1) 'real objects', 2) 'sensual objects', 3) 'real qualities', and 4) 'sensual 
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qualities', where “the sensual is what exists only in relation to the perceiver, 
and [...] the real is whatever withdraws from that relation.” (Ibid., p. 110) This 
brings about four pairings that combine an object pole and a quality pole: 
“real object/real quality, sensual object/sensual quality, real object/sensual 
quality, and sensual object/real quality.” (Ibid., p. 49) Let us now take a look at 
the four basic tensions of  1) 'time', 2) 'space', 3) 'essence', and 4) 'eidos', and 
the way in which they are related to the four objectively constitutive breaks of  
linkage between the four poles of  reality: 1) 'causation', 2) 'theory', 3) 'allure', 
and 4) 'confrontation'. 
 'Time' is defined by Harman as the tension between sensual objects and 
their sensual qualities in the sense that objects of  experience do seem to have 
a certain amount of  durability despite the fact that they constantly undergo 
change as regards their particular phenomenal make up. 'Space', on the other 
hand, has to do with the tension between veiled real objects and their sensual 
qualities, in the sense that any object-object- or object-subject-relation is an 
expression of  both relation and what Harman calls 'non-relation'. Non-
relation points to the fact that, following Harman's own example, when we 
stand in the city centre of  any given metropolis we do not fully exhaust the 
reality of  the metropolis in question. We relate and thus perceive certain 
aspects of  the total reality of  the city-object in question, yet we never relate to 
and fully perceive the whole city. Thus, when we relate we both relate and 
non-relate. 'Eidos', for Harman, signifies the tension between sensual objects 
and their real yet unconcealed qualities. The 'eidetic features' of  an object 
cannot be known through sense perception, but can instead be encountered 
through the use of  what Husserl called 'categorial intuition', i.e. by the means 
of  the intellect. Last but not least, Harman introduces us to the notion of  
'essence', which he invokes as the name of  the tension between real objects 
and their obscure real qualities. Thus essence signifies the qualitative being of  
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objects independent of  object-object- or object-subject-relations. Whereas the 
tension of  space follows from Heidegger's tool-analysis, the tension of  eidos 
follows from Husserl's phenomenological discovery of  real objects within 
experience. (Cf. ibid., p. 100-102) 
 Following the ontological status of  Heidegger's fourfold, Harman 
characterises the status of  the relations of  his new fourfold as tensions or 
structural moments rather than physical forces: “The interaction of  time, 
space, essence, and eidos is not the play of  four disembodied forces, but of  
four tensions affecting every object that in some way is.” (Ibid., p. 102) Now, 
whereas tensions and structural moments can be interesting in their own right, 
Harman goes on to consider how change in the objective state of  affairs is 
possible and actually takes place, and in order to do so, he considers the ways 
in which the different tensions of  objects emerge and dissolves – that is, how 
'fusion' and 'fission' occur. When changes occur in the sensual qualities of  a 
sensual object due to, for instance, physical displacement of  the bodily 
position of  the perceiving subject, the object in question “is briefly exposed as 
a unified kernel dangling its qualities like marionettes.” (Ibid., p. 103) Harman 
calls this experience of  intimate encounter with the extra-sensuous being of  
an object of  experience 'confrontation'. We confront the being of  objects 
when we spend time with them, thus experiencing that their shifting 
phenomenal guises does not destroy or annihilate their being. When 
considering the tension of  space we confront the relation between real objects 
and sensual qualities, hence the relation between objects in the depth and 
qualities emerging as surface effects. The 'fusion', to follow Harman's lingo, 
of  real object and sensual quality is given the name of  'allure', due to the fact 
that the spatial state of  relation and non-relation points to the alluring status 
of  sensual qualities in relation to a real object only alluded to. For Harman, 
qualities of  sensuous experience function as the bait of  objects, so to speak, 
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'confrontation' being the possible outcome. 
 'Theory' is the name that Harman employs in order to designate the 
fission that occurs between sensual objects and their real qualities. The 
analytical endeavours of, say, academics or political commentators might serve 
as an illustrious example of  what Harman understands by 'theory'. When 
analysing an object of  experience – the collected works of  Shakespeare or 
Barack Obama's most recent State of  the Union Address –, what happens is 
that the sensual object is suspended or bracketed in order for the analytically 
engaged researcher to split it “from the real qualities it needs in order to be 
what it is.” (Ibid., p. 104) Last but not least, Harman invokes the name of  
'causation' to refer to the fusion of  a real object and its real qualities. 
According to Harman, “the object itself  does not have its own essential 
features.” (Ibid., p. 105) Instead, the real object itself  simply functions, to use 
Harman's own metaphor, as an invisible sun bending its qualities to its will. 
(Cf. ibid., p. 103) Real objects, therefore, might be considered as ontological 
black holes not strong enough to fully engulf  the qualities of  reality, yet strong 
enough to keep the qualities of  the world in a constant state of  movement, 
flux and becoming not far from the event horizon of  objectivity. (Cf. ibid., p. 
102-105) The exotic qualities of  Harman's basic outline of  OOO is not hard 
to see. Metaphysics, as presented from the point of  view of  OOO, might 
therefore seem, as he himself  puts it, like “a Caribbean region where proper 
relations between objects were corrupted by rum, parrots, and volcanoes.” 
(Ibid., p. 105) 
 Now that we have seen the structural kernel of  Harman's ontology, let 
us now take a look at some of  the overall implications of  this structural 
composition. In his thought-provoking contribution to the burgeoning list of  
speculative realist publications Alien Phenomenology from 2012 with the telling 
subtitle What it's like to be a thing, American philosopher Ian Bogost 
53 
 
summarises OOO's 'strange' conception of  mereology, i.e. the study of  parts 
and the wholes they form, in the following way: ”Things are independent 
from their constituent parts while remaining dependent on them.” (Bogost 
2012, p. 23) A clear and distinct echo of  Spinoza's conception of  singular 
things is heard in Bogost's brief  summary. For Spinoza, as well as for Bogost 
and Harman, an aggregate, accumulation or constellation of  objects or 
singular things that together function as the cause of  an effect must itself  be 
considered as an object or singular thing. Bogost illustrates this rather abstract 
mereological insight by way of  a container ship: 
 
The container ship is a unit as much as the cargo holds, the shipping containers, the 
hydraulic rams, the ballast water, the twist locks, the lashing rods, the crew, their 
sweaters, and the yarn out of  which those garments are knit. The ship erects a 
boundary in which everything it contains withdraws within it, while those individual 
units that compose it do so similarly, simultaneously, and at the same fundamental 
level of  existence. (Ibid., p. 22) 
 
What the example illustrates is the status of  objects in the Harman's OOO, 
namely that 'it is objects all the way down', to paraphrase the much celebrated 
mytheme of  the world being carried on the back of  a turtle, which is itself  
carried on the back of  a turtle, and so on to infinity. (Cf. Harman 2011, p. 
113) Harman himself  offers another example to illustrate the objective 
nesting of  reality, and we now return to the example of  the windmill. 
According to Harman, a windmill typically involves at least the following 
objects: “ladders, pumps, rotating blades, and wire-mesh crow's nests.” 
(Harman 2005, p. 93) Considered as a whole the windmill functions by 
reducing its constituent parts to that which Harman gives name of  'useful 
caricatures'. (Ibid., p. 94) In this way, and by means of  the necessary reduction 
of  objects that goes into the making of  such a thing as a windmill, the 
windmill does not do justice to the objects that go into the construction of  a 
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windmill. Instead of  letting the objects concerned be the objects that they are, 
the windmill considered as an autonomous object only allows for its objective 
constituents to realise certain and possibly relatively few aspects of  their 
being. As such the example of  the windmill illustrates the 'fractal' aspect of  
Harman's OOO: ”[W]e have a universe made up of  objects wrapped in 
objects wrapped in objects wrapped in objects.” (Harman 2005, p. 85) 
 It is important to note that the metaphysical principle of  'non-
exhaustion' does not only hold for object-object-tensions, but holds in equal 
degree in the case of  object-subject-tensions. As Harman puts it: “[T]o 
perceive means to encounter sensual objects on the interior of  a larger object, 
and that a real entity is located on such an interior thanks to a relation that 
makes it a component of  that more encompassing object.” (Harman 2011, p. 
122) To perceive is therefore to enter into a tensional relation with an object 
thereby composing a 'larger' object. Harman points out that both in the case 
of  object-object-tensions and object-subject-tensions “the sum of  parts is always 
greater than the whole.” (Harman 2005, p. 94) This follows from the windmill-
illustration of  OOO's commitment to the metaphysical principle of  non-
exhaustion. Every object is in reality a 'larger' object composed of  other 
objects, which, in their own right, are 'larger' objects relative to their respective 
caricatured components, and so on to infinity. 'Larger', that is, than the objects 
that any given object relates to as its constituents, but not in respect to the 
absolute 'largeness' of  the component objects of  any given object considered 
in themselves. In the last instance this inevitably leads to a metaphor that 
Harman invokes on several occasions: “If  we imagine the universe as an 
ocean, it would be an ocean without a floor, but with a turbulent surface of  
objects and nothing but empty sky above.” (Harman 2011, p. 113) 
 Now, six years later from the date of  publication of  Guerilla Metaphysics, 
Harman draws the metaphysical consequence of  this weird view of  objects, 
55 
 
which might be called, 'fractal objectivity'. With reference to Kant's 'ban' “on 
ruling either for or against an infinite regress of  pieces” (Ibid., p. 112), 
Harman nonetheless sides with the former option, stating that whereas it 
makes good sense to talk about an infinite regress of  objects, it makes bad 
sense to talk about an infinite progress: “The cosmos has no bottom, but does 
have a surface. There may be an infinite regress, but no infinite progress: no 
final, encompassing object that could be called a universe.” (Ibid., p. 122) This 
also points to the philosophical notion of  'asymmetry' that Harman 
introduces in order to properly describe the tensional relations between 
objects. No two objects ever meet on the same level, so to speak. They will 
only encounter one another in the shape of  more or less useful caricatures 
based on the local logic of  the specific tension in question. (Cf. ibid., p. 117) 
 Given Harman's initial definition of  'an object' as “anything that has a 
unified reality that is autonomous from its wider context and also from its 
own pieces” (ibid., p. 116), my opening claim that the notion of  ontological 
non-exhaustion is the key metaphysical concept of  OOO now ought to be 
justified. It is not a coincidence that Harman on multiple occasions refutes the 
traditional privilege of  the human mind in relation to exhausting objectivity by 
means of  conceptual understanding. In 2005 Harman programmatically stated 
the following: 
 
No privilege is to be granted to objects over against mere aggregates, as though 
atoms were real and baseball leagues only derivative, or individual soldiers real and 
armies only derivative. What must be avoided is any initial dogma at all as to whether 
there are ultimate building blocks of  the cosmos from which everything else is 
constructed. The important thing is that any objects, at any level of  the world, has a 
reality that can be endlessly explored and viewed from numberless perspectives 
without ever being exhausted by the sum of  these perspectives. (Harman 2005, p. 76, 
my emphasis.) 
 
Six years later he had distilled the implications of  this view of  objects into the 
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almost slogan like claim that “object-oriented ontology holds that the human-
world relation has no privilege at all.” (Harman 2011, p. 119 – se also ibid., p. 
6 and 67) The difference in philosophical outlook between Hegel and Harman 
ought therefore not to be hard to see, insofar as Hegel's philosophical 
idealism is all about thinking the world in relation to its relation to human 
being qua knowing. 
 Now, before we reach the end of  my treatment of  Harman's OOO, it is 
essential that I say something about the derivative conception of  freedom that 
follows from Harman's metaphysical investigations. As he himself  makes clear 
in the very last sentence of  The Quadruple Object, the logic of  objects presented 
in his current philosophical magnum opus gives us “a powerful map of  the 
cosmos from which further conclusions can easily be drawn.” (Harman 2011, 
p. 143) What might such conclusions be in relation to the conception of  
'freedom'? 
 Insofar as human perception, knowledge and action all take place 
within the confines of  Harman's 'larger objects', and 'freedom' in its minimal 
definition is understood as 'acting without undesirable determination of  
external causation', human freedom must, from an OOO point of  view, be 
related to mapping, challenging and/or even breaking the already established 
links between the four poles of  reality, i.e. real objects, real qualities, sensual 
objects, and sensual qualities, in order for new and more expedient tensions to 
be brought about. 'More expedient', that is, in relation to the values, interests 
and ends of  human being. Harman's fourfold cosmic map can, in this way, be 
used as a compass for navigation in the shadowy realm of  the great outdoors. 
Object-oriented imperatives of  freedom might be phrased along the lines of  
the following suggestions: 'confront the multitude of  sensual qualities of  any 
given object in order for the sensual object itself  to be identified', 'theorise the 
objective state of  affairs in order for the real qualities of  merely sensual 
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objects to see the light of  day', 'pay attention to the allure of  real objects by 
means of  their flashy sensual qualities' and 'engage in the process of  
reengineering fusion of  the causality between real objects and real qualities 
based on the practices of  theory and the phenomenon of  allure'. Thus, it is 
not just the objects of  the world that take on a fourfold shape, but also 
human freedom itself. Four ways are indirectly proposed by Harman's OOO 
for freedom to take place – four ways to navigate the frothy waves of  the 
ocean of  objects. 
 By linking freedom with the experiential and intellectual mastering of  
the objective state of  affairs, Harman is shown to be an heir of  Spinoza. As 
we saw in my treatment of  Spinoza's conception of  freedom, the externally 
caused affective determination of  human being is that which must be 
intellectually overcome in order for rational self-determination to emerge in 
the life of  human being. Similarly, we have now seen how it follows from 
Harman's OOO that human freedom must be thought in relation to the 
fourfold ontological determination of  objects, and human being's experiential 
and intellectual mapping of  its objective entanglement in the objective state 
of  affairs. By using 'Harman's compass' as a map of  fourfold instructions, 
human being is set free to navigate the tumultuous surface of  the waters of  
objects in similar fashion to the emancipatory subject of  Spinoza's Ethics. 
 The logic of  Harman's OOO and it's derivative implications for the 
conception of  human freedom entail the following attitude towards the 
tripartite meaning of  the title of  my article: 1) freedom is brought about 
through the active manipulation of  the objective state of  affairs in accordance 
with the navigatory potential of  Harman's new and empowering fourfold, 2) 
through the free acts of  human being nature is revealed to be a rich, diverse 
and objective state of  affairs exhibiting an infinite series of  dynamic variations 
of  quadruple objectivity, and 3) nature is itself  shown to be free whenever 
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free acts are performed by, for instance, human being insofar as human being 
does not transcend the ontological plane of  objects, but is born, lives, dies and 
dissolves totally immersed in the torrential streams of  objects. 
 Reflecting on the implications of  his novel discoveries Charles Darwin 
famously stated that “[t]here is grandeur in this view of  life.” (Darwin 1859, p. 
490) The same can be said of  the work of  any brave philosopher who has 
dared to draw the astonishing conclusions of  his/her initial thoughts, and it 
certainly is a fitting characterisation in the case of  Harman's OOO. Therefore, 




Having traversed the realms of  three different philosophers, the time has now 
come to review what answers might have emerged to my initial questions that 
served as the guideline for my attempt to determine the nature of  freedom in 
its tripartite sense. We have seen how Spinoza, Hegel and Harman all share a 
common veneration for linking philosophical thinking with the human 
capacity for freedom. Human being is enabled to navigate reality in different 
ways depending on whether it is Spinoza's, Hegel's or Harman's philosophical 
outlook that inspires human being. Overcoming affective bondage is enabled 
by Spinoza's Ethics, overcoming conceptual self-deception is enabled by 
Hegel's Logic, and overcoming restrictive objectivity is enabled by Harman's 
OOO. Thus, neither of  the three thinkers, defining the conceptual coordinates 
of  my article, can be said to rule out the emancipatory project of  philosophy 
of  any of  the two others. Instead, we ought to see the philosophically distinct 
programs of  thinking proposed by Spinoza, Hegel and Harman respectively 
as reciprocally supplementary, due to the fact that they deal with three quite 
different conceptions of  both nature and freedom, and thus they cannot be 
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said to exclude the conceptual results of  each other. It simply is not the same 
'nature' and 'freedom' they entertain in their respective philosophies. But the 
fact that their conceptions of  nature are all seen to be correlated with their 
conceptions of  freedom, and vice versa, brings together the three 
philosophers in respect to their programmatic definition of  the end of  
philosophy, i.e. to free human being. 
 Whereas Slavoj Žižek in 2011 proclaimed that the 21st century would 
belong to Hegel, I now declare that the true heirs of  Spinoza's metaphysics 
and the dominant philosophical trend of  the 21st century will turn out to be 
Harman and his still growing gang of  object-oriented ontologists. (Cf. 
Crockett, Davis and Žižek (Ed.) 2011, p. ix-xi) What we need is a fusion of, on 
the one hand, Spinoza's taste for the ontological autonomy of  objects in 
relation to the affective determination of  human being, and, on the other, 
Hegel's taste for the ontological significance of  human knowing and, 
therefore, for the ontological autonomy of  'the notion' ('der Begriff') in order 
to due away with both one-sided realism and unworldly idealism. Such a 
fusion is, I conclude, what we find in tentative form in OOO – even though 
Bogost, Harman and the rest their crew have not yet fully worked out the 
implications of  their metaphysical expeditions in the exotic realm of  the great 
outdoors. 
 At the end of  The Quadruple Object Harman makes the following 
remark concerning OOO's attitude towards knowledge production within 
other domains than philosophy:  
 
Our goal is not just to say that the humanities are irreducible to physics, but that 
geology and chemistry are irreducible to physics as well. Each domain has its realities, 
which are not reducible to where they came from. Object-oriented philosophy does 
not reduce, and hence offers no finger-wagging lectures to the humanities on behalf  
of  science. Nor does it offer such lectures to science on behalf  of  postmodernist 
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theories of  a science constituted by the discursive practice of  power. (Harman 2011, 
p. 143) 
 
Because of  Harman's emphasis on what he calls the “relative democratization 
of  the various forms of  knowledge” (Ibid., p. 142) it does not makes sense to 
use Žižek's diagnosis of  a contemporary metaphysical tendency towards a 
nostalgic return to what he calls 'the primacy of  concrete reality' (see Crockett, 
Davis and Žižek (Ed.) 2011, p. x) as an adequate analysis of  the speculative 
realist sub-genre of  OOO. Instead, what we find in OOO is a pioneering 
mode of  thinking that points in the direction of  great theoretical syntheses of  
different domains of  natural science and humanistic research still to emerge in 
the shape of  fruitful collaborations directed towards an increasingly nuanced 
uncovering of  reality's objective state of  affairs. In this sense, OOO shares 
Hegel's veneration for 'concrete' thinking, due to its sympathy for the 
combination of  perspectives in relation to unearthing the objects of  the 
world, though it clearly follows from my account of  Hegel and Harman that 
their respective realisations of  the ideal of  concrete thinking radically differ in 
practice. 
 Philosophy ethically shapes human being in accordance with the degree 
in which the opinions of  the human being in question show themselves to 
diverge from reality, i.e. the objective state of  affairs. Therefore, the distance 
between opinion and truth signals the amount and intensity of  philosophy's 
ethical potential in any given case. Depending on the specific program of  
emancipatory thinking 'nature' will take on different guises – e.g. ontologically 
primordial substance (Spinoza), externalised generality (Hegel), and a roaring 
ocean of  ontologically autonomous objects (Harman). But in all cases the 
attainment of  freedom is associated with the knowledge of  the non-human 
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